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NOTES AND COMMENT
The only Montana decision concerned with injury to an un-
born child is the case of Hosty v. Moulton Water Co." This case
has been cited in support of the proposition that recovery cannot
be had for the death of an unborn child, at the suit of the
mother." A careful reading of the opinion leaves considerable
doubt that this question was fully considered. The complaint
charged that, through negligence of the defendant, plaintiff was
so injured and mentally disturbed that, being pregnant, she lost
her child and became sick, and on that account suffered great
pain and injury. The defendant filed a general and special de-
murrer, the latter for uncertainty. The trial court sustained both
demurrers, and plaintiff did not amend. The trial court then
ordered judgment against the plaintiff "upon the merits" and
entered judgment dismissing the complaint. On appeal, the
Montana Supreme Court ruled that the special demurrer was
properly sustained, but did not pass upon the merits because of
the uncertainty of the complaint. The District Court judgment
was affirmed, but modified by striking the words "upon the
merits" from the judgment.
However, the Montana Code" contains a provision identical
to the California statute cited above, declaring an unborn child
to be an existing person, so far as necessary for its interests in the
event of its subsequent birth. This statute has never been con-
strued by the Montana Court. But in view of the present day
decisions on this problem, and the construction placed on the
identical provision by the California Court, it is likely that the
question will be decided in favor of recovery when it arises in
Montana. ROBERT BENSON
PERIODICAL ALIMONY OR SUPPORT DECREES AS
LIENS PER SE ON REALTY
This comment considers the effect in Montana of a properly
docketed decree for permanent periodic alimony or support pay-
ments automatically becoming a lien on real property of the
husband. Alimony payments in gross, temporary alimony pay-
ments, and decrees providing in themselves for the imposition of
a lien as security, are not included within this discussion.
The rule expressed in most states is that, although the court
may create a lien on the defendants' real estate as part of the
"39 Mont. 310, 102 P 568 (1909).
"10 A.L.R. (2d) Death § 2, p. 640.
'
7R.C.M. 1947, § 64-103.
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decree for periodic payments, a decree without this command
does not impose such a lien automatically.1 The argument most
frequently advanced for this view appears in Mansfield v. Hill,
where the Court said:
"The provision of the divorce decree for future
monthly payments by defendant until further order of
the court, being for an indefinite time and amount not
yet accrued, is not a definite liability or a judgment for
a specific sum which may become a lien upon his prop-
erty. ' 
Other states have reached the opposite conclusion on the
theory that without this automatic lien the decree would be in-
effectual to insure those payments to which the wife and chil-
dren are legally and morally entitled."
Montana is apparently in accord with the minority view.
In Raymond v. Blancgrass' defendants unlawfully converted 150
sheep from plaintiff's husband prior to plaintiff's separate
maintenance decree for periodic support payments. Plaintiff
brought this action in equity to recover and apply the value of
the sheep to past due support payments. The Court said she
failed to state a cause of action in that she had an adequate
remedy at law.' But during discussion of the matter Chief Jus-
tice Brantly stated:
"While decrees in equity often extend to and cover
matters entirely beyond the purview of judgments at
law, they are nevertheless judgments within the defini-
1Jones v. Jones, 204 Ark 654, 163 S.W. (2d) 528 (1942) ; Yager v. Yager,
7 Cal. (2d) 213, 60 P. (2d) 422 (1936) ; Robinson v. Robinson, 154 Fla.
464, 18 So. (2d) 29 (1944) ; Wallace v. Wallace, 189 Ga. 220, 5 S.E.
(2d) 580 (1939) ; Masters v. Masters, 249 Il1. App. 252 (1928) ; Rosen-
berg v. American Trust & Sav. Bank, 86 Ind. App. 552, 156 N.E. 411(1927); Trunkey v. Johnson, 156 Kan. 804, 137 P.(2d) 186 (1943);
Campbell v. Trosper, 108 Ky. 602, 57 S.W. 245 (1900) ; Marshall v.
Marshall, 164 Md. 107, 163 A. 874 (1933) ; Harris v. Worsham, 164 Miss.
74, 143 So. 851 (1932); Tureck v. Tureck ....... Mo. App ....... 207 S.W.
(2d) 780 (1948) ; Gray v. Gray, 44 N.D. 89, 176 N.W. 7 (1919) ; Olin v.
Hungerford, 10 Ohio 268 (1840) ; Bussey v. Bussey, 148 Okla. 10, 296
P. 401 (1931) ; Mason v. Mason, 148 Ore. 34, 34 P.(2d) 328 (1934)
Swanson v. Graham, 27 Wash. (2d) 599, 179 P.(2d) 288 (1947).
256 Ore. 400, 107 P. 47, (rehearing) 108 P. 1007 (1910).
8Westmoreland v. Dodd (CCA) 2 F.(2d) 212 (1924) ; Davis v. Davis,
228 Iowa 764, 292 N.W. 804 (1940) ; Harrington v. Grieser, 154 Neb. 685,
48 N.W.(2d) 753 (1951) ; Warren v. Warren, 92 N.J.Eq. 334, 112 A. 729(1921) ; Buffalo Savings Bank v. Hunt, 118 N.Y. Supp. 1021 (1901) ;
Lynn v. Lynn, 76 Pa. Super. Ct. 444 (1921) ; Beesley v. Badger, 66 Utah
194, 240 P. 458 (1925) ; Bray v. Landergren, 161 Va. 699, 172 S.E. 252(1934) ; Holcomb v. Holcomb, 122 W.Va. 293, 8 S.E. (2d) 889 (1940).
'36 Mont. 449, 93 P. 648 (1908).
'he Court interpreted the husband's right of action against the defend-
ants as subject to execution.
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tion of the statute.., and, so far as they award in any
case a recovery of money, they are in nowise different
from judgmnts at law. In legal effect there is no dis-
tinction.... When properly docketed they become liens
upon the real estate of the debtor. They are enforced by
execution just as are judgments in legal actions . . . An
order directing the payment of money is pra hac vice a
judgment, and may be enforced by execution.., even if
the statute did not contain this provision, the court
would adopt the most appropriate process .... And it
cannot be doubted that the execution would be most ef-
fective and appropriate."
The Blancgrass dictum plainly points out that Montana's equity
decrees awarding recovery of money become a lien on real estate
in the same manner as judgments at law.
The Blancgrass case is cited and supported by Decker v.
Deckere and later by Lewis v. Lewis' where the Courts both recite
the proposition that a lien is automatically imposed on the realty
of defendant when the decree is properly docketed, just as judg-
ments at law.
The most recent case on this question is Lay v. District Court'
where Chief Justice Adair said:
"There are various means of enforcing orders di-
recting the payment of support money in actions for
divorce. The most common are: (a) By requiring the
husband to give security for enforcement of the pay-
ments ordered. Sec. 5775, Rev. Codes of 1935 .. . ;
(b) by contempt proceedings... ; (c) by execution, as
in the case of other money judgments (Raymond v.
Blancgrass, 36 Mont. 449, at page 458, . . . Decker v.
Decker, 56 Mont. 338, . .. and (d) by invoking the police
power of the state to punish the parent for willfully
failing, refusing or neglecting to support his child.... "
(Italics supplied).
Assuming as established that a Montana alimony or separa-
tion decree for the payment of money does create a lien per se,
the next pertinent inquiry is as to the character of this lien and
the quantum of the husband's real property encumbered thereby.
The Blanegrass decision stated in effect that so far as equity
decrees award a recovery of money, they are treated the same as
judgments at law, and similarly become liens upon the real
estate. Therefore, for purpose of determining the extent of real
656 Mont. 338, 185 P. 168 (1919).
'109 Mont. 42, 94 P.(2d) 211 (1939).
0122 Mont. 61, 198 P.(2d) 761 (1948).
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property included under the lien in question, it would seem rea-
sonable to rely upon Montana's statute pertaining to judgments
at law which provides:
"... from the time of filing, the judgment becomes a
lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor, not
exempt from execution, in such county, owned by him at
the time, or which he may afterward, and before the lien
expires, acquire. The lien continues for six years, unless
the judgment be previously satisfied.'
Speculation on the nature of this lien primarily stems from
Raymond v. Blancgrass coupled with the subsequent case of
Lewis v. Lewis."° The unsettled dicta of these cases opens the
door to several positions that Montana might take regarding the
extent of the lien imposed:
(1.) The broadest interpretation of the Montana decisions
permits a lien attaching at the time the decree is docketed and
covering payments due and to become due. Chief Justice Brant-
ly leaves this inference in the Blancgrass case when he states:
"The plaintiff, then, by the recovery of her judg-
ment against her husband, became his creditor for the
amount adjudged to be due her at the time of its entry,
and also for the amounts accruing thereon from month
to month, and occupied toward him the position of any
other creditor." (Italics supplied).
This unique position is held by several states."
Later the Montana Supreme Court, in Lewis v. Lewis,'
casually attempted to qualify the liberal Blancgrass statement in
saying, by way of dictum:
"However, it would seem that the lien would be for
only the accrued and unpaid installments, and not for
such installments as might thereafter accrue."
Examining the dicta of these cases together would reasonably
seem to allow the next two additional characterizations of the
lien.
(2.) A less liberal view is taken by some courts in that the
lien attaches and secures the installments at the time they respec-
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-5712.
"Snupra, note 7.
"Westmoreland v. Dodd, (CCA) 2 F.(2d) 212 (1924) ; U.S. v. Spangler,
94 F. Supp. 301 (1950), (good criticism of this type lien) ; Lynch v.
Rohan, 116 Neb. 820, 219 N.W. 239 (1928) ; Buffalo Savings Bank v.
Hunt, 118 N.Y. Supp. 1021 (1909) ; Bray v. Landergren, 161 Va. 699,
172 S.E. 252 (1934); Gain v. Gerling, 109 W.Va. 241, 153 S.E. 504
(1930).
Sufpra, note 7.
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tively fall due in the future." At first glance, the general judg-
ment lien statute" providing for a lien to attach "from the time
of filing," might appear to exclude this theory. However, it can
reasonably be reconciled by regarding each accrued installment
as a judgment taking effect as of the date due' and construing
the statute to mean the "judgment" becomes a lien when entered
only for the amount then due, but attaching to future install-
ments as they mature from time to time. Also there is no con-
flict with the Lewis case dictum (supra) because the lien never
secures an unaccrued installment.
(3.) Finally, construing the cases in their most limited
sense, the lien would attach upon entry of the decree and only
payments due at that time would be secured.
Limitation of action upon the liens under consideration
presents the next problem. In holding that the lien created by
the trial court in its decree was such as to defeat a suit to quiet
title, the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
"It was urged most strenuously on oral argument
that the effect of such a judgment is to tie up all of the
plaintiff's property so that he cannot dispose of it or
handle it in any manner, and that such incumbrance
may continue indefinitely. It is doubtless true that such
may be the effect of the judgment.' ""
California has a statute ' similar to Montana's" allowing the court,
in its discretion, to require encumbrance of certain property to
secure payments. Their courts interpret the statute of limita-
tions pertaining to ordinary judgment liens as not applying to
this special discretionary lien."
However, the lien dealt with in this discussion is not one
which is specially created by the court but one which the decree
imposes per se. The lien in question must draw its efficacy from
the general judgment lien statute and consequently would, in any
event, seem to be limited by the 6 year statutory period.2 This
would mean that the broadest lien, which includes all past and
future payments, and also the most limited lien, covering only
payments due when the decree is docketed, would be enforceable
'Warren v. Warren, 92 N.rT.Eq. 334, 112 A. 729 (1921) ; Lynn v. Lynn,
76 Pa. Super Ct. 444 (1921) ; Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144
P.(2d) 528 (1943).
"2Supra, note 9.
"McKee v. McKee, 154 Kan. 340, 118 P.(2d) 544 (1941).
"Schuster v. Schuster, 33 Ari. 279, 264 P. 100 (1928).
"Calif. Civil Code § 140.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 21-140.
"Gaston v. Gaston, 114 Cal. 542, 46 P. 609 (1896).
"mSupra, note 9.
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for a maximum of 6 years from the date of entry. Under the
theory that a lien doesn't arise until an installment becomes due,
however, it would follow that the six year statutory period would
date from the time each future installment payment matured.
The propositions covered, as yet, have not been considered
directly by the Montana Supreme Court and so the character of
these liens is largely left to speculation.
Broadly interpreting the Montana cases as creating an im-
mediate lien at the time of docketing for accrued and unaccrued
installments has the obvious effect of imposing a flaw upon the
marketable title which would be difficult, and in some cases pro-
hibitive in costs, to erase. But, as a result of Montana's uncer-
tainty, the only safe position for attorneys and title insurance
companies is to allow for the broadest interpretation of the cases
and codes and consequently treat the lien in question as encum-
bering the property for all past and future installments from the
date of entry for the statutory period of 6 years.
The necessity for such an oppressive lien, in the opinion of
this writer, has little foundation in view of a Montana Code pro-
vision allowing the court, in its decree or subsequent thereto, to
require the husband to furnish security for payment of future-
installments.' Liens upon real estate have been interpreted as
"security" within the purview of this statute."
At most, the limited construction of the lien securing merely
payments due upon entry of decree would include only costs, at-
torneys fees, and possibly the first installment.
The better view, in this writer's opinion, would be the con-
struction allowing the lien to include each future installment as it
becomes due. This would give a certain amount of protection to
the wife and children and, at the same time, permit the un-
hindered conveyance of clear title merely by payment of the in-
stallments accrued at the moment of transfer.
This question is constantly arising and Montana's equivocal
position necessarily results in the expense, burden, and lost time
incident to reasonable professional caution. Clarifying legisla-
tion or judicial interpretation would be desirable.
ROCKWOOD BROWN, JR.
.Supra, note 18, providing: "The court or judge may require the husband
to give reasonable security for providing maintenance or making any
payments required under provisions of this chapter, and may enforce
the same by appointment of a receiver, or by any other remedy applica-
ble to the case."
nSupra, note 7.
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